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Summary: The paper examines the concept of international power in connec-
tion with demographic trends as forecast by the United Nations. It focuses its
attention on the situation of Africa, a region projected to become the second
largest in terms of population by the turn of the century. The argument to be
developed is that the large number of new entrants to labor markets of African
countries will likely be deprived of the labor skills necessary to allow them earn
a livelihood. The “demographic dividend” will thus be denied and the conse-
quences will be felt not only in Africa but in the world at large, most acutely in
Europe. To prevent the rise of this “disruptive” power in Africa the paper offers
some novel ideas on how to redesign Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
so as to promote human capital investment.
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The main goal of this paper is to analyze the challenges and opportunities presented 
by the huge expected increases in the population of the African continent until the 
end of this century. 
It has long been recognized that population plays an important role in power 
relations. According to United Nations (UN) projections Africa’s share of the world 
population is set to more than double. Whether African nations will be able to man-
age this sort of population growth is an important issue for the entire world. The an-
swer to this question clearly revolves around the ability of African societies and gov-
ernments to vastly increase investment in the human capital of incoming population 
cohorts. 
These prospects provide the main theme for the paper. The next two sections 
provide a brief discussion of the concept of power in international relations and re-
view the projections of the UN and some of its implications. After a discussion of 
possible scenarios for Africa as these prospects unfold, some policy suggestions re-
lated to the design and scope of ODA programs directed towards Africa are pre-
sented. 
 
1. Power and Population in International Relations - Related 
Literature 
 
As noted by most authors in the field, power is a notoriously elusive concept of in-
ternational relations. Its importance has, however, been well recognized from the 
times of Thucydides, the Athenian general and historian. Despite controversy over its  
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precise meaning, there seems to be consensus on the general notion that, as noted by 
David A. Baldwin (2013, p. 177), power involves the capacity of “one agent induc-
ing or making another agent do something it would not otherwise do”. This is also 
stressed in Kosta Josifidis and Alpar Lošonc (2012, p. 513) when, in their discussion 
of the relation between power and value in economics, they assert that power entails 
that “certain economic agents influence other agents so that they provoke particular 
activities”. It is also generally acknowledged that power is a stronger concept than 
influence and a weaker one than control. There seems to be also agreement on the 
fact that power does not simply “grows out of the barrel of a gun”, as the famous 
quotation of Mao Zedong (Stuart R. Schram and Nancy J. Hodes 1995, pp. 31-36) 
would have it, although military power is certainly an important component of na-
tional power. In this vein, the exercise of some forms of power, certainly the case of 
military power, is to be distinguished from the existence of power. In the case of 
“soft power”, a concept introduced by Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2004), this distinction van-
ishes. 
The classic reference of Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) distinguishes a variety of 
elements of national power, namely geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, 
military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, and the quality 
of diplomacy. Each one of these elements, by it alone, may not be sufficient to ensure 
national power. It is usually a combination of sufficient levels of a number of these 
elements that will generate that effect. 
More recently, other authors (see a good review in Chapter 2 of Brian Nichi-
poruk 2000) have stressed the relation between demographic trends and security, 
especially in connection with the security outlook of developed countries. Paul De-
meny and Geoffrey McNicoll (2006) have also introduced the term “political demog-
raphy” to refer to the effect that evolving population patterns are bound to have in the 
world distribution of power. 
For the sake of the development of our argument, we will single out the popu-
lation element. It is important to bear in mind that, as noted by Morgenthau, a nation 
may have a huge population and its power be quite small. Such was the case of China 
during most of the 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th century when it was, 
indeed, being progressively subdued by Russia, Japan and Western powers. Its simi-
larly large population did not prevent India from falling prey to an expansionist Great 
Britain. On the other hand, as Morgenthau also observed, it is hard for a nation to 
achieve enduring power without a sufficiently large population. 
 
2. A Review of Population Trends to the Year 2100 
 
The latest iteration of the UN population forecasts (UN 2011) provides a detailed 
picture of the evolution of the world population through the year 2100 under a num-
ber of scenarios or “variants”. The UN considers four different “variants” for their 
forecasts. They are, with increasingly high rates of growth of populations, a “low 
variant”, “medium variant”, “high variant”, and a “high-fertility variant”. We will 
limit here ourselves to discussing briefly some of the most important results of the 
“medium variant”, considered to be the most likely to take place. According to these 
forecasts the world population will increase from some 7 billion in 2011 to around 
10.1 billion in 2100. Little of this increase will take place in the developed world,  
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whose population will go from 1.2 billion in 2011 to 1.3 billion in 2100. On the other 
hand, the population of the developing areas will go from 5.7 billion in 2011 to 8.8 
billion in 2100. Were it not for migration flows, the population of the developed 
world would actually decrease during this period. 
Regarding age structure, the proportion of children (less than 15 years of age) 
will remain higher in developing regions than in developed regions, although the dif-
ference will narrow (see Table 1). A symmetric effect takes place in regard to the 
aged population (65 years or older): their share of the total population is higher in 
developed than in developing countries throughout the entire period, although that 
difference keeps decreasing. Of course, these differences are due to asymmetric fer-
tility rates, much higher in the developing than in the developed regions. Interest-
ingly, the projections indicate a convergence in those rates towards a common range 
around 2.0 in 2100, close to the replacement rate. This convergence underlies the 
narrowing in differences pointed out before and also explains the general aging of the 
world population. The share of aged population for the entire world increases from 
7.7% in 2011 to 22.3% in 2100 while that of children decreases from 26.6% in 2011 
to just 17.9% in 2100. As the increase of the aged population is higher than the de-
crease of the young population, the proportion of working age adults decreases, from 
65.7% in 2011 to 59.8% in 2100. That proportion is projected to become higher in 
developing regions (60.3%) than in developed regions (56.1%), thus reversing the 
current situation. 
 
Table 1   Evolution of World Population and Age Structure: 2011-2100 (Millions and Percent) 
 
 
Total population 2011  Total population 2060  Total population 2100 
0-14 15-64 65+  0-14 15-64 65+  0-14 15-64 65+ 
World 
6 974 036  9 615 189  10 124 926 
26.6%  65.7% 7.7% 19.7%  62.0% 18.3% 17.9% 59.8% 22.3% 
More developed  
regions 
1 240 380  1 310 345  1 334 786 
16.5% 67.3% 16.2% 16.8% 57.0% 26.2% 16.9% 56.1% 27.0% 
Less developed  
regions 
5 733 657  8 304 845  8 790 140 
28.7%  65.4% 5.9% 20.2%  62.8% 17.1% 18.1% 60.3% 21.6% 
 
Source: Data processed by author from UN (2011).  
 
These projections are striking and, as we shall see in a moment, they become 
more so when we get down to the regional and country level. It is rather amazing that 
most discussions about their potential geopolitical and economic implications have 
remained at a rarefied level and have yet to enter the domain of public debate. Given 
that the goal of this paper is to discuss the outlook for Africa, I will privilege fore-
casts for that region. Asia remains of course the largest region of the world with 
45.4% of the world population in 2100. However, Africa surges into second place 
with 35.3% compared with just 15% in 2011. Its population becomes more than five 
times larger than that of Europe (including Russia) and it dwarfs other regions as 
well. As a matter of fact, less than one in five of the world’s inhabitants are forecast 
to live outside of Asia or Africa in 2100, compared with more than one in three in 
2011 (see Figure 1).  
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Source: Data processed by author from UN (2011). 
 
 
Figure 1  Distribution of Population by Major Region: 2011 to 2100 
 
African population growth, at 240% over the entire period, is unevenly dis-
tributed across countries and, as a result, some of them exhibit phenomenal growth in 
their population. Thus, the population of Tanzania increases by a factor of ten over 
the period, while those of Niger and Malawi rise by a factor higher than eight. Of the 
24 countries projected to have a population larger than 100 million in 2100, 10 are 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). As of now only one country in Africa, Nigeria, 
has reached that level. 
Nigeria is a good example of the transformation the region is forecast to ex-
perience over the remainder of this century. With a projected 730 million in 2100, 
Nigeria is poised to become the third largest country in the world, its population lar-
ger than that of Europe, Latin America or North America. Transformations in age 
structure lead to even more striking results. If we look at population of working age 
(from 15 to 64 years of age), Nigerian population in this group becomes comparable 
to that of China and 75% higher that of the United States (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Source: Data processed by author from UN (2011). 
 
 
Figure 2  Working Age Population of Four Major Countries: 2011 to 2100 
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These figures should not be dismissed lightly. For the fact is that they corre-
spond to the medium variant of UN projections, with moderate assumptions about 
the evolution of fertility rates. According to them, and as explained before, fertility 
rates would converge across regions towards a value close to the replacement rate. 
The latter implies, in particular, that the regional distribution of the world population 
would remain relatively stable into the 22
nd century. 
 
3. The African Conundrum 
 
The figures just discussed for the evolution of African population throughout the re-
mainder of this century are startling and, as said before, their implications have yet to 
enter the domain of public discussion. Even if we take into account the cautionary 
words of Morgenthau about the significance of population for the sake of power it 
seems rather clear that these developments are bound to affect international power 
relations, not the least those among Africa and its closest neighboring region, 
Europe. 
Two extreme possibilities arise as we think about the way in which this evolu-
tion will occur over time. The positive one is that rising populations in Africa will 
receive the education they deserve, acquire the skills needed to sustain themselves 
and to contribute to society, and meet an economic environment where sufficient 
demand for labor exists. Under this rosy scenario the economic size of Africa grows 
together with its population and the region will indeed become more powerful. How 
this power is exercised and projected is of course another matter, not to be discussed 
here, but presumably African power would not take a very different form than that of 
other nations or regions. The second extreme, negative possibility is that African 
countries are unable to manage the tide of growing population cohorts. Poor educa-
tion for the children, insufficient skills for the young adults entering the labor force, 
and disorganized markets convert the “demographic dividend”, always a promise 
rather than a hard reality, into a “demographic nightmare”. Under this bleak scenario 
the economic size of Africa would not increase commensurately with its population, 
thus denying the region of the economic element of power. However, the region 
would still possess what I would call a “disruptive” power, that might even be higher 
than that under the first scenario and whose projection would be definitely alarming 
to its neighbors and beyond. The huge population numbers and their dire situation 
would pose a continuing challenge to other countries, especially in Europe, and con-
stitute a threat to their stability in a variety of ways. 
These polar scenarios are useful in helping us to visualize the range of possi-
bilities that may arise as demographic, social and economic processes unfold in the 
continent. It is of course impossible to ascertain the course that Africa will take 
within this very long time horizon and we can only, based upon the observation of 
recent trends in Africa and the world, provide some comments on whether the situa-
tion will evolve towards a positive or a negative state. 
On the one hand, Africa has made reasonable progress during the last decade 
or so, as attested by the figures from the World Bank (WB 2013a). Real GDP for 
SSA increased by a yearly average of 4.8% during the first decade of this century, 
which compares well to the yearly average of just 2.1% over the previous two dec- 
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ades. Similarly per capita real GDP rose by an annual average of 2.2%, much better 
than the average decline of 0.75% observed over the previous two decades. These 
progressive trends, basically continued during the more recent years, have led some 
to express a high degree of enthusiasm about the long-term future of the continent. 
Exemplary of this mood is the recent publication by Charles Robertson et al. (2012), 
an articulate analyst of the Renaissance Group, a Russian-owned investment group 
with extensive interests in the region. In the same vein, and in a recently published 
tract, Justin Y. Lin (2012a), a former Chief Economist of the WB, has also argued 
vigorously that Africa, were it to adopt the right policies, could follow the way of 
East Asia in the post-war period. Both authors emphasize their conviction that Africa 
should be able to achieve high growth rates without help from other nations. Those 
views are broadly shared by other authors, such as Kingsley Y. Amoako (2005), Ed-
ward A. Miguel (2009), and Theodore H. Ahlers et al. (2014). 
On the other hand, there are many other facts justifying a skeptical view or, at 
the very least, a more balanced stance. The daunting challenges that most African 
countries facing in taking advantage of the “demographic dividend” are well illus-
trated in the recent contribution by Jean-Pierre Guengant and John F. May (2013). 
Moreover, a second look at the figures from the WB (2013a) reveals that the average 
per capita real GDP for the region in 2010 was only US$ 653 in dollars of 2000, and 
just US$ 458 when South Africa is taken out of the measurement. That represents an 
increase of slightly less than 10% during the entire 30-year period starting in 1980 
(23.1% if we exclude South Africa). Another noteworthy fact is that the relatively 
robust growth of the past decade has taken place in the context of an ever-increasing 
demand for raw materials originating from China. As noted by a recent study from 
the WB (2013b), this is unlikely to continue and, inasmuch as African growth has 
been largely dependent on high prices and high demand for the commodities they 
produce, the medium-term outlook for their economic growth is not very positive. 
The same study also observes that the effect that recent African growth has had on 
poverty reduction (“growth elasticity of poverty”) is much lower than in other devel-
oping regions of the world, an effect that they ascribe to the still very unequal distri-
bution of income. These arguments point towards the fact that Africa is still coping 
with a situation of extreme backwardness and that their economies are vulnerable to 
whatever variations take place in the world economy. We also need to keep in mind 
that any comparison with East Asia in the post-war period should take into account 
the widely different historical backgrounds and institutional heritages. As we are re-
minded by Carlos Aquiar de Medeiros (2011) there is an important link between the 
buildup of institutions and the creation of economic structures crucial to economic 
development. Abdelkarim Yahyaoui and Atef Rahmani (2009) also emphasize this 
point, especially in connection with financial structures. 
Placing the preceding discussion against the background of the UN projections 
under the “medium variant”, it is not farfetched to assign a significant probability to 
an outcome close to the second scenario described above. 
 
4. A Role for ODA and Human Capital Investment 
 
The entire world, developed countries in particular and especially those in Europe, 
have naturally every reason to wish for a virtuous combination of population increase  
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with economic and social development in Africa. As it has been argued by a number 
of authors (see, for instance, the blog posting by Lin 2012b), there are at least two 
important conditions that will have to be met by African countries for this to take 
place. First, invest sufficiently in the human capital of the young, and thus ensure 
that they will become employable and productive. Second, improve the quality of 
governance and the necessary institutions to that end in such a way that an environ-
ment of political participation and economic freedom is assured. 
Both conditions require hard work on the part of African nations although it 
seems that outside assistance would be most helpful for meeting the first one. With-
out belittling the importance of the first condition, I will limit the following discus-
sion to ways in which ODA can be refashioned and used to that end. 
It is necessary to keep in mind that as of 2011, net disbursement of ODA by 
member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to African countries 
south of the Sahara was some US$ 29 billion. Including flows from multilateral 
agencies raises it to US$ 43.8 billion (see OECD 2013, p. 252). This amounts to 
slightly less than US$ 50 per inhabitant of SSA countries. There are additional ODA 
flows from other sources, in particular from China. Although their levels are not as 
well recorded, it is unlikely that these flows will dramatically raise the figures 
quoted. It also bears in mind that only a portion of development assistance flows is 
allocated to items related with social development, such as the expansion and im-
provement of education and health services. Moreover, given that most of these 
funds are channeled through central and local government bodies, they are prone to 
be exposed to various inefficiencies and corruption in such a way as to be considera-
bly diminished before reaching their intended beneficiaries. 
This background suggests rather forcefully that if the developed world wants 
to support a positive route for Africa as its population grows it needs to reform con-
siderably the way it provides ODA to the region. In what follows I outline a set of 
recommendations in that direction. 
These recommendations are based on the recognition of the need to tackle 
three points. First, ensure the provision of sufficiently large flows so as to finance 
investment in human capital for all new born (universality). Second, maintain these 
flows until countries become able to take charge of that kind of investment by them-
selves (consistency). And third, target the flow of funds directly to its final benefici-
aries (minimal intermediation). A consequence of the first two points is that the grant 
component of these flows should be minimal; the magnitude of the necessary funds 
to be transferred also implies the need to attract the interest of international financial 
markets. Official aid, both bilateral and multilateral, would in this case take mainly 
the form of the provision of guarantees to private investment in the human capital 
development of African nations. The third point suggests that the flow of funds 
would go towards the purchase of securities issued by individuals that would be as-
sociated with their expenses related to investment in their own human capital. 
Taking account of these observations, and borrowing extensively from Nean-
tro Saavedra-Rivano (2012), where a related idea was discussed in a different con-
text, we outline a new system to organize and supervise investment in human capital  
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as well as the flow of funds that would finance it. The main elements of this system, 
involving the close cooperation of national and international authorities, would relate 
to the issuing of securities by individuals, their packaging into assets to be placed in 
the international financial markets, and the repayment of incurred debts by benefici-
aries over the course of their adult life. In what follows the main processes of the 
operation of this system are described: 
 
(i) The main institution necessary to the implementation of the system is the 
Central Registry and Repository (CRR for short), an agency charged with keeping 
records of all relevant transactions and with the regulation of the secondary market 
for assets originating from these transactions. Operation of this agency would involve 
the participation and cooperation of national authorities and those of multilateral aid 
authorities; 
(ii) Starting from initial time, each newborn is automatically endowed with an 
Individual Capital Account (ICA) and becomes entitled to charge selected expenses 
related to his/her human capital development to that account. Limitations on the use 
of the account will include, most importantly, the limit age (say, for the sake of ar-
gument, 15 years) and a spending profile. The former establishes the age beyond 
which expenses can no longer be charged to the ICA. The latter is a time path of es-
timated costs normally required for the upbringing of an individual that will set quan-
titative and qualitative constraints to the use of the account through time; 
(iii) Providers or sellers of goods or services will be registered at the CRR and 
properly certified; 
(iv) Each purchase of a good or service by an ICA holder will give rise to a 
triangular transaction between the ICA holder, the provider of the good or service, 
and the CRR. This transaction, much as a credit card transaction, will credit the pro-
vider (with the amount of the transaction) and will create an asset (for the CRR) and 
a liability (for the ICA holder) of equal value; 
(v) The CRR will conduct at this stage a process of anonymization whereby 
anonymous securities, backed by the named securities, are issued and sold to primary 
financial institutions. As a result of this process the named securities become assets 
for the CRR and the anonymous securities its liabilities (to the financial institutions, 
who will keep them as assets); 
(vi) The primary financial institutions will then proceed to package the now 
homogeneous securities (HC) into financial products of suitable size and maturity 
that will be offered to the financial markets. We will call these securities HC securi-
ties; 
(vii) Although interest rates on HC securities would most likely have to be ini-
tially set by the regulator, the markets will ultimately determine them; 
(viii) Once individuals reach the limit age, and allowing for a grace period to 
be specified, they must initiate repayment of the accumulated debt plus interest; 
(ix) Repayment will be automatically deducted from earnings or income and 
collected by the CRR. The CRR uses, in turn, these sums to buy HC securities in the 
financial markets, so that both assets and liabilities in its balance sheet are reduced 
by the same amount. 
 
Figure 3 below provides a graphical illustration of these steps and of the eco-
nomic flows associated with the scheme. The population is broken down into two  
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functional groups or cohorts: young and working adults. The other boxes represent 
the productive sector, the international financial sector and the central agency (CRR). 
Earnings of the working population, consisting in this simplified model entirely of 
wage income, are spent in one of two ways: their own consumption, and repayment 
of their own debt to the CRR. The diagram also shows the transactions between the 
CRR and the financial system, both the creation of HC securities and their redemp-
tion, and the triangular transactions associated with purchases of goods and services 
by the young. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Saavedra-Rivano (2012). 
 
 
Figure 3  Flows Associated with the Creation and Circulation HC Securities 
 
Such a transformation of ODA, from a system that provides a small stream of 
subsidized loans and grants to another providing a robust stream of private and pub-
licly guaranteed funds targeted to finance human capital development, would also 
transform relations between the emerging African powers and the rest of the world. It 
would help not only in deflecting the “nightmare” scenario but, by binding together 
Africa and other regions in the common goal of development, might be instrumental 
in persuading the emerging giant to exercise wisely its newly acquired power. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has discussed the implications of projected demographic trends for the 
future of Africa and its relative position in the world order. If UN population projec-
tions are taken seriously, and undoubtedly these are the most authoritative existing 
forecasts, already by mid-century Africa’s population will surpass that of all other 
regions combined except Asia. Its most populous country, Nigeria, will become the 
third largest in the world and by the turn of the century its population will exceed that 
of Europe (including Russia). Despite a relative surge in growth observed during the 
past decade or so, the extreme backwardness of the region, its vulnerability to chang-
ing external conditions, and the fragility of its institutions, justify a considerable 
anxiety about the kind of power that Africa will come to project in the world, espe-
cially in Europe, by the end of this century. Fortunately, there seems to be scope for 
the world community to cooperate with African authorities in coping with population 
trends and their many implications, and this paper has discussed some suggestions 
that go into that direction. Of course, any action by the world community requires 
recognizing the existence of this trend and acknowledging its urgency. We hope that 
this paper has contributed to raising that awareness. 
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